Denied by Design

New Space Is Ascendant With Limits For War.

The space technology industry is inherently constrained because it requires zero-fail tolerance and the systematic development and deployment of complex systems. It’s not like software, where rapid iteration and shipping early can be rewarded. Once a space asset is in orbit, it can’t be recovered—you’re stuck with what you launched. With the exception of software updates like firmware or control scripts, changes are nearly impossible post-deployment.

That means the design, specification, and development phases are everything. Where many software entrepreneurs reject conventional design practices in favor of speed, that mindset doesn’t translate to space. A single overlooked variable can destroy a mission. SpaceX changed perceptions by introducing a venture-style, rapid-test ethos—but even that came with controlled risk and heavy investment. Beyond SpaceX, few have replicated this success at scale.

The People.

The people in space are weird. That’s not a dig—it’s an observable. There are monthly “space” conventions, it seems, and one afterparty allegedly featured adults playing spin the bottle in a hotel room. These are grown professionals, many in their 30s to 50s. I thought I’d seen the peak of cringe as a contractor inside the FBI, but that would have topped it.

Then there’s the Defense crowd. No one takes themselves more seriously. Every young white guy thinks he’s one clearance away from being an honorary operator. Now mash that cultural cocktail with the socially arrested space scene. You get a spaghetti monster wearing a flight suit and arguing about orbital supremacy between Call of Duty matches. I kid, I kid, all jokes aside.

This isn’t an attack on space or science—it’s a critique of the worship. The belief that space will somehow deliver answers to our terrestrial dysfunction is fantasy. In national security, space assets are not “concepts.” They’re systems. And systems only matter if they’re part of a plan, coordinated, and create a specific effect at the right time and place.

The defense and space S&T community burns billions admiring problems. Prototypes get built not to solve mission needs, but to show off tech. They develop “new capabilities,” not new concepts. SDA’s warfighter council is a good step—it invites operational input. But the cultural mismatch remains: space romanticism and defense elitism. A sector trapped in the mirror, like Dorian Gray, aging beneath its surface gloss.

The Concepts.

Space Excels at Surveillance—Not Battlefield Magic

Space’s true strength is strategic surveillance. Satellites remove the need for dangerous manned orbits like U-2 overflights or even some long-endurance ISR sorties. We’ve replaced boots and bolts with big eyes in the sky.

But let’s not kid ourselves. Tactical operators and maneuver forces aren’t going to be riding some proliferated LEO satellite wave into battle. The idea that a ground force will tie targeting, maneuver, and C2 to a constellation of orbiting sensors feels like marketing.

China Will Preempt

Everyone knows it: the first move in a peer fight is to blind your opponent. China has the means and doctrine to strike our space assets before shots are fired. Why wouldn’t they? They’ve tested ASATs, built ground-based dazzlers, and launched co-orbital systems. If we anchor our tactical edge to vulnerable LEO systems, we’re giving away the game.

Satcom: Not Low-Profile

Let’s talk about satcom. There's no such thing as LPI/LPD from a satellite. You're beaming across the entire curvature of the Earth. A “low probability of detection” signal coming from space is an oxymoron. No matter the band—X, Ka, L, or whatever—you’re transmitting from an obvious, observable origin to a fixed point. Any actor with near-peer SIGINT is going to see it.

This is not how you run clandestine operations or enable precision fires and maneuver. You need terrestrial comms, mesh networks, short hops, smart relays—systems designed for contested EM environments, not big sky beams.

ISR Is Valuable, But It Has Limits

Space ISR is a strategic tool. It’s impactful enough that key adversary targets are moving underground. Deep, hardened, multi-level bunkers—space can’t see through concrete and rock. That drives a different kill chain. Not Army SF or Navy SEAL stuff. We’re talking tier-1 raids with strategic-level planning, HUMINT, SIGINT, and underground target access. Space can’t solve that. It can’t even see it.

The “Operator Schedules a Satellite” Fantasy

Here’s the most repeated vignette I’ve heard from the LEO-obsessed:

“An operator hikes up to a ridge, wants to see what’s over the other side, pulls out a device, requests imagery from a satellite, and gets it just in time to plan an assault.”

Let's break down how that fails:

Why That Scenario Doesn’t Work (Technically + Tactically)

1. Orbital Timing Is Not On-Demand
   Unless the satellite is perfectly positioned, you’re not getting that shot anytime soon. "Tasking" an on-orbit asset still depends on when it passes over the area of interest.
2. Latency and Bandwidth
   Even if the satellite is on-station, data has to be downlinked, processed, validated, and then delivered. We're not talking seconds. It’s minutes to hours, depending on the pipeline.
3. Cloud Cover and Camouflage
   EO/IR doesn’t see through clouds, foliage, or concealment. You’re not spotting a fighter under a tarp, in a tree line, or tucked behind a rock face.
4. No Tactical Resolution
   The res isn't tight enough for fine-grain tactical calls. You won’t see an IED, a dug-in RPG team, or a tripwire. You’ll get a nice top-down image of terrain you could’ve scouted with a UAV or a recce patrol.
5. Security Risk in Comm Path
   That imagery has to be pushed back to the operator. If it's done over satcom, you just lit up your position with an obvious RF handshake. You’re now detectable in enemy SIGINT.
6. Breaks Patrolling Doctrine
   No team is pivoting on the fly because they got a space image from higher. That’s how you get killed. You recce, confirm, plan, and execute based on what you know and control—not a JPEG from 300km above Earth.
   1. Principles of patrolling = PRSCC - Planning, Recce, Security, Communication, Common Sense
      1. Space ISR data complements Recce - it does not resolve a tactical problem

Tactical Operators Don't Need Sky Pixies

This fantasy, where a SOF guy becomes a "space tasker" while in motion through key terrain, is tactically flawed. It promotes the illusion that access to data equals decision-making superiority.

It doesn't.

That satellite photo won’t replace a patrol, won’t substitute for fieldcraft, and won’t compensate for broken comms when the enemy jams your SAT terminal. And when near-peer enemies are part of the picture, LEO becomes an early casualty. We’re back to radios, relays, and recon. Not orbital support fantasy.

Chinese Doctrine and the Space-Denied Operational Environment

Chinese military planners do not assume uninterrupted access to space-based assets in conflict. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has systematically developed doctrine, organizations, and capabilities designed to contest and degrade adversary space systems from the outset of hostilities. The core concept is that space is not only a domain of observation or communication—but a strategic high ground whose denial is central to success in modern warfare.

1. PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF) and Counter-Space Mission

The PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF), established in 2015, is the PLA's operational entity responsible for integrating space, cyber, and electronic warfare functions. RAND notes that the SSF “appears to be charged with launching and operating China’s satellite architecture” and conducting “co-orbital counterspace mission[s] involving satellite-on-satellite attacks” (RAND, 2017).

Recent assessments confirm that the SSF is not a symbolic command, but an operational force with growing responsibilities for both offensive and defensive counter-space operations. These include ground-based jamming, cyber intrusion, co-orbital grappling systems, and the use of directed energy weapons. According to a 2023 report from the China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI):

“China’s counterspace capabilities span the full spectrum of kinetic and non-kinetic effects… including reversible electronic jamming of satellite communications and GPS, co-orbital ‘on-orbit’ inspection and interference, as well as kinetic ASAT capabilities” (CASI, 2023).

2. Strategic View of Space as a Combat Domain

Authoritative Chinese doctrinal texts, such as The Science of Military Strategy, repeatedly frame space as a "commanding height" of modern warfare. In the 2013 and 2020 editions, Chinese strategists argue that space must be controlled and, when necessary, denied:

“To ensure victory in informatized warfare, it is necessary to seize and maintain control over the commanding heights of space... This includes the use of soft kill methods such as electronic interference and hard destruction methods such as missile attacks to sever enemy space-ground links” (PLA Academy of Military Sciences, 2013).

China has invested in a full spectrum of capabilities to actualize this doctrine. These include:

• Ground-based ASAT systems, exemplified by the 2007 SC-19 missile test, demonstrated the ability to destroy satellites in low Earth orbit.
• Directed-energy weapons can dazzle or damage optical sensors aboard satellites.
• Co-orbital systems, with maneuvering capabilities for proximity operations and potential satellite neutralization.
• Electronic warfare systems, including mobile and fixed jammers targeting SATCOM, GPS, and ISR links.

As described in the 2022 DIA report Challenges to Security in Space, these capabilities are fielded with the explicit purpose of deterring and degrading adversary use of space in wartime (DIA, 2022).

3. Operational Implications for U.S. Military Space Architecture

China’s doctrinal and technical posture assumes that U.S. forces will rely heavily on space-based ISR, positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT), and communications. PLA strategy places high priority on disrupting or degrading those systems early in a conflict.

This introduces critical vulnerabilities into the U.S. space architecture, particularly within proliferated Low-Earth-Orbit (LEO) constellations intended to support Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2). Designed to offer resiliency through distribution, these constellations still operate under orbital and electromagnetic physics that render them vulnerable.

The assumption that tactical and operational forces will retain real-time access to space-based ISR and comms is inconsistent with the PLA's demonstrated capabilities and stated intentions. If adversary doctrine explicitly plans to degrade these functions, then reliance on space systems for C2 and maneuver becomes strategically brittle.

Chinese doctrine does not assume a permissive space environment. The PLA plans for and trains for a space-denied operational environment. US Mil must treat access to space as conditional, not guaranteed. Terrestrial communications, hardened PNT alternatives, and degraded mode operations must be not just redundant but primary in planning for conflict with a peer adversary.

Where Does That Leave Tactical Space?

Right where it was before—promising, but unproven for the US military at war.

Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) constellations offer potential advantages in the battlespace. They had a real impact in Ukraine, especially in filling gaps where terrestrial infrastructure collapsed. But Ukraine is not Taiwan. It's not the South China Sea. And it’s not a stand-in for direct confrontation with China under Pacific conditions.

Ukraine is a war of holding terrain, not maneuvering to take it. Terrain was seized early—now it's contested. The communication problem there is one of scale and durability, not denial. FPV drones and tactical comms are in flux, but still function. In the Indo-Pacific, we face a different fight: extended lines of communication, island chains, maritime kill boxes, and dense triple-canopy jungle. In that environment, overhead ISR and satcom are blocked by terrain and physics. It’s not the same game.

Don't Confuse Tactical Novelty with Strategic Readiness

There’s this emerging idea that LEO will “sprinkle” bandwidth from the heavens wherever it’s needed, especially where terrestrial networks can’t reach. That’s appealing, especially to rigid command structures that don’t trust mission command. And to be fair, there is potential. LEO comms can offer lower latency over long distances than traditional geosynchronous systems. It’s a strategic backhaul option. But it's not a replacement for tactical agility.

Space systems could be Corps-level ISR: high-value, high-overhead assets that require deliberate tasking and distribution. They’re probably not something a platoon sergeant pulls up on an app. Not yet. But the culture in DARPA and the broader S&T community often trivializes warfighting structures because they look simple on a BPMN diagram. Operations don’t run on swimlanes.

The US Military can't Assume Space Will Work

Space might be the only path left if terrestrial networks are denied, jammed, spoofed, or destroyed. But that’s not a plan. That’s a hope. And you can’t build doctrine on hope.

The assumption that LEO will enable Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) is just the latest in a string of techno-utopian promises. We heard the same pitch about “5G + AI = Victory.” It was marketing then, it’s marketing now.

The battlefield doesn’t care about PowerPoint logic chains.

There’s a quiet fantasy embedded in the JADC2 pitch—what some call the "OnlyFans of war."

Every sensor streaming. Every shooter live. Every operator mic'd, mapped, and mission-tasked in real time by a TOC hundreds or thousands of miles away.

That’s not war. That’s surveillance cosplay. And if that's the comms architecture you're relying on when the fight starts, you're going to lose faster than you can buffer.

Ok, I call it that and thought of it while writing this.

If space fails—if it's shot down, jammed, blinded, or simply delayed—what's the fallback?

So What?

Space Force and "New Space" earned their spotlight. Venture hype, mouth-watering demo videos, and ambitious promises brought new blood into the sector. Many without space heritage found it easy—and convenient—to dismiss terrestrial communications as outdated or inferior. It's easy to hand-wave LSCO at a bottle-spinning after-party between vape hits. After all, there’s not much jamming in space. No trees. No buildings. No terrain to block line-of-sight. Compared to Earth, space wireless looks clean.

But here's the point: the US military must keep innovating, but not forget the hard fight of terrestrial communication. Don’t lose the uphill battle to fund, prioritize, and protect terrestrial communications—the real fallback, the last mile, and often the only mile when it counts.

Dependencies kill. Complacency kills.

Rely too heavily on orbital constellations, and you're playing roulette with missions. Terrestrial communications is hard. That’s why so few enter, disrupt, deliver, or dominate in it. The physics are punishing. Terrain, atmosphere, urban density, spectrum constraints—all far more complex than vacuum-space line-of-sight.

But communication remains the key terrain. If we think it's key terrain, then China does, too, and they will target it.

China will attack the U.S. network.

The more dependent we are, the more visible our architecture becomes—the less secure the signal, the more likely the denial. Space is not safe. It is observable, interruptible, and by design—undefended.

The success of Starlink in Ukraine is not a proof point for LSCO in the Indo-Pacific. Ukraine is a low-intensity, land-centric, limited air denial conflict. The Pacific is not that. We're betting billions on space—and we should. For GPS. For strategic surveillance. For collection and risk reduction.

But don’t mistake the intelligence layer for the communications backbone.

If communication is the key terrain—and it is—US Mil needs more than one way to hold it.